Abstract: Why are relations between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) sometimes conflictual and others collaborative? This article evaluates hypotheses in the International Relations and social movements literatures with reference to relations between NGOs associated with the anti-/alterglobalization movement (AGM) and multilateral economic institutions (MEIs). Drawing on an original database and interviews with MEI and NGO staff members, the article shows that attributes of NGOs rather than the political or economic environment—including NGO budgets, ideology, and organizational structure—better account not only for an overall increase in collaboration with IOs since the late 1990s but also a growing divergence among NGOs regarding the acceptability of such collaboration.

Keywords: Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, globalization, global governance
Whither the anti-/alterglobalization movement (AGM)?\textsuperscript{1} Although post-2008 economic turmoil has renewed scrutiny of “neoliberal globalization,” the Occupy Wall Street and related demonstrations in fall 2011 did not replicate the scale or persistence of 1999-2001 protests against the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and Group of 8 (G8) in Seattle, Prague, and Genoa, whose participants numbered in the hundreds of thousands. While economic stagnation and growing inequality in Europe in particular have produced reaction through the ballot box, why have advocacy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) not recaptured the halcyon days of the AGM?

This puzzle invites larger questions about relations between global civil society and global governance institutions within a broader trend of the politicization of global governance (Zürn et al 2012; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). The International Relations (IR) and social movement literatures tend to emphasize structural determinants of international organization (IO) and/or NGO behavior—whether the political or economic environment or other aspects of the context in which IO-NGO relations are embedded—but have paid less attention to attributes of NGOs themselves. With the notable exception of Tallberg et al. (2013), the most comprehensive empirical investigations of IO-NGO relations (see among others O’Brien et al. 2000; Higgott et al. 2000; Fox & Brown 1998; Weiss & Gordenker 1996; della Porta & Tarrow 2005; Khagram et al. 2002) employ only case study analysis and thus are limited in their capacity to account for broader IO-NGO relations.

This article examines the fate of the AGM and IO-NGO relations more generally using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative analysis is based on a sample tracking 37 NGOs’ relations with major multilateral institutions—including United Nations (UN)

\textsuperscript{1} Scholars and practitioners disagree as to whether antiglobalization or alterglobalization is the proper term to describe this large and diverse movement. I elide this debate by adhering to the neutral acronym AGM.
agencies, multilateral economic institutions (MEIs), and key European institutions—from the early years of the AGM to the rise and fall of the Occupy movement (1996-2011). It finds that three micro-level factors—the resources, ideology, and organizational structure of NGOs—played a larger role than structural factors in inducing growing collaboration in IO-NGO relations. Yet beneath an overall increase in cooperation was a strategic divergence within the AGM regarding whether to collaborate with IOs in general and the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and other MEIs in particular. Qualitative evidence indicates this divergence emerged as the composition of the AGM changed beginning in the late 1990s—as more radical and decentralized NGOs joined the coalition—and intra-coalition fractures grew among “new” and “old” NGO networks within a less hospitable international political and economic environment.

The article begins with a brief overview of trends in IO-NGO relations during 1996-2011 and prevalent hypotheses in the literature to explain them. The empirical investigation starts with a quantitative analysis of overall IO-NGO relations, which tends to support micro-level hypotheses focused on NGO budgets, ideology, and organizational structure, and continues with a qualitative analysis of AGM groups’ relations with the MEIs and each other that offers greater dimension to, and tends to confirm, these results. The conclusion considers these findings’ implications for our understanding of the AGM and IO-NGO relations more generally.

On IO-NGO relations

Among the structural shifts in international politics in the 1990s, the simultaneous rise of the “three globals”—globalization, global governance, and global civil society—was particularly striking in its departure from the state-centric, security-driven order of the Cold War. As economic integration increased, multilateral economic institutions were empowered to regulate
international economic relations, and an exploding population of international advocacy NGOs increasingly sought to shape and contest the evolving rules governing globalization. In a context in which “the global” was (and is) still being defined, relations between NGOs and IOs have become a central element defining the character of global governance.

While many advocacy groups criticize MEIs in particular for the perceived negative effects on workers, environment, or social justice of free-market policies these institutions prescribe, the period 1996-2011 was one of growing IO-NGO collaboration overall. IOs expanded opportunities for collaborative engagement to labor, environmental, and other advocacy groups, in part in response to claims that the former were secretive and unaccountable and global governance as a whole suffered from a “democratic deficit.” United Nations (UN) agencies in particular saw large increases in NGO accreditations: ECOSOC, a focal point for IO-NGO relations in the UN system, increased the number of NGOs with consultative status from 1041 in 1996 to 3556 in 2011; UNCTAD, the UN Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change saw similar increases. For NGOs, such opportunities present a choice between collaborative, “insider” strategies (lobbying and accreditation) and more adversarial, “outsider” strategies (protest), with strategies falling on a continuum based on the particular mix of collaborative and contentious activities pursued.

The literature on IO-NGO relations broadly divides between structural and micro-level approaches. Liberal IR theories focus on the structural conditions determining IOs’ accessibility. Emphasizing institutions’ functional utility in performing tasks that help states solve cooperation dilemmas and provide collective goods, liberal theorists expect IOs to offer access to high-capacity NGOs with resources and expertise that can facilitate completion of these tasks.

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3 On insider versus outsider strategies, see della Porta 2009; Fogarty 2011; Kalm & Uhlin 2015.
(Raustiala 1997; Betsill & Corell 2008; Fogarty 2013). Tallberg et al. (2013) identify a range of “governance problems” IOs face, particularly monitoring and implementation that NGOs with expertise and/or local civil society connections can help overcome. For example, the World Bank might seek assistance monitoring borrowers’ implementation of environmental or governance programs from the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) or Transparency International. Thus IOs are expected to select for high-capacity NGOs, collaborating with those possessing resources that can be brought to bear in relevant governance tasks.

The social movements literature features two prominent structural theories of social movement organization (SMO) mobilization. The first highlights political opportunity structure (POS)—how the political, economic, social, and/or technological “state of the world” shapes NGOs’ incentives, mobilization, and ultimately relations with authorities (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 2005; della Porta & Tarrow 2005). The more open or vulnerable political authorities are, the stronger and more sustained SMO mobilization is expected to be. According to Sikkink (2005), NGOs cooperatively engage the most accessible national and/or IO authorities. If institutions are open at only one level, NGOs should exploit access at that level to pressure closed institutions at the other; if there is a change in relative openness, there should be a corresponding change in patterns of NGOs engagement.\(^4\) Thus an increase in the openness of IOs coupled with a decrease in the accessibility of governments—as occurred in the more intense post-9/11 security environment—should have induced greater NGO collaboration with IOs (Tallberg et al. 2013; Bandy & Smith 2005; Podobnik & Reifer 2005, *passim*).

Resource mobilization theory, for its part, claims the exigencies of organizational survival require SMOs to adopt strategies toward authorities that maximize their capacity to

\(^4\) In her work with Margaret Keck (Keck & Sikkink 1998), Sikkink identified the “boomerang” effect of NGOs’ engagement of IOs to put pressure on national governments. Here the directionality is reversed: NGOs might engage national officials—especially in powerful states—to effect change in IOs.
acquire resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983; Cooley & Ron 2002). NGOs typically obtain funding from governments and foundations—which may be central actors in international advocacy networks (e.g., the Gates Foundation and public health networks)—and thus NGOs must adapt their activities to funders’ preferences. All else equal, when economic downturns reduce available funding and thus create a more competitive resource environment, we should expect NGOs to choose collaborative, insider strategies toward IOs—which donors tend to prefer (Staggenborg 1988)—over confrontational, outsider strategies. A decline in the availability of resources from foundations, governments, or IOs themselves should induce NGOs to collaborate with international organizations to improve their attractiveness to donors.

While structural theories deemphasize agency and thus elide strategic variation across NGOs, micro-level theories consider NGOs’ internal attributes, distinguishing between “old” and “new” social movement organizations and focusing in particular on ideology and organizational structure (Kitschelt & Hellmans 1990; Kriesi 1996). Dalton (1994) showed how NGOs are driven by ideological principles and inclinations toward status quo structures. Reformist NGOs seek incremental reform and work with incumbent authorities to adjust prevailing policies; radical groups reject the existing system and thus collaboration with state, IO, or corporate authorities (Scholte 1999; Green & Griffith 2002). Therefore, reformist NGOs should collaborate with IOs more than radical ones, and overall IO-NGO collaboration should vary with the prevalence of reformist groups in the broader population of advocacy NGOs.

Others (Bandy & Smith 2005; Martens 2006) have argued that variation in NGOs’ organizational structure—specifically, the extent to which they centralize and bureaucratize (i.e., formalize) their international networks—can affect relations with one another and international

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5 The availability of resources is central to both the resource mobilization and POS approaches; Dalton (1994) treats the two as essentially the same. The distinction here highlights the difference between NGOs’ survival and strategic imperatives.
organizations. Fogarty (2011) argued that informal, decentralized SMOs are more wary of collaboration with IOs than those with more bureaucratic structures in their international umbrella organizations. Two factors explain this difference: first, IOs prefer to engage more formalized NGOs; and second, less formalized NGOs tend to be more committed to their decentralized, networked structures—which they might have to sacrifice in order to work with IOs. Thus we should expect formalized NGOs to engage more collaboratively with IOs than informal ones, and overall IO-NGO collaboration to vary with the prevalence of formalized groups in the overall NGO population.

Of these hypotheses, those emphasizing political opportunity structure and the resource environment imply all NGOs respond similarly to changing political and economic conditions. Therefore, we would expect general improvement in IO-NGO relations in 1996-2011 to reflect changes in the resource and/or political environment. The latter two hypotheses focus on changes within the NGO population, linking a shift in IO-NGO relations to changes in the ideological and organizational composition of this population. The liberal hypothesis is something of a hybrid: it emphasizes NGO attributes (resources), but agency lies with IOs rather than NGOs.

Quantitative analysis of trends in IO-NGO relations

To evaluate these hypotheses, I gathered data on 37 NGOs associated with the AGM and pooled the data to generate 555 observations, with the NGO-year as the unit of analysis. The period 1996-2011 was selected to examine IO-NGO relations from the beginnings of the AGM to the rise of the Occupy movement.6 With some caveats, regression analysis tends to support the

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6 Two additional factors informed the focus on the 1996-2011 period. First, there was stability in control over IOs—notably, Western dominance of MEIs—and thus we can hold constant variables associated with great power control (see Krasner 1995; Drezner 2007). Second, prior to 1996 the available data on sampled NGOs are quite sparse.
liberal, ideology, and formalization hypotheses, and cast doubt on the resource mobilization and POS hypotheses.

Sample selection and descriptive statistics

Sampled NGOs were selected using several criteria. The first was association with the AGM, with association understood broadly to capture the wide range of groups in the movement (Ostry 2001; Pleyers 2010). Specifically, NGOs were chosen from the list of signatories to the Our World Is Not For Sale petition against the WTO in Seattle in November 1999, a widely distributed manifesto for the emerging AGM. Selected NGOs are representative of both the AGM coalition and global civil society more generally in terms of constituent groups’ age, resources, ideology, structure, headquarters (North v. South), and issue focus (including labor, environmental, development, human rights, feminist, religious, Third World, anticapitalist, and anarchist groups). Second, because the study focuses on global civil society, selected NGOs are international—i.e., possess an international umbrella organization (e.g., Greenpeace International) coordinating affiliates in two or more countries. Due to this focus on international NGOs, the sample includes somewhat more groups headquartered in the North than in the South. Third, NGOs lacking sufficient data on the variables of interest—drawn primarily from annual editions of the Yearbook of International Organizations, and supplemented with information from their websites and/or annual reports—were excluded. Table 1 below lists the sampled NGOs, indicating their issue focus, year founded, headquarters, and scores on the dependent and explanatory variables in 2011.

**TABLE 1 HERE**
Among these NGOs, the trend over 1996-2011 was toward greater collaboration with international organizations. This trend is indicated by a collaboration index, comprising binary variables for lobbying and protest and a continuous variable for the number of accreditations in a given year. The index ranges from -1 to 1, with the lower limit indicating pure “outsider” contestation (protest without lobbying or accreditations) and the upper limit pure “insider” collaboration (lobbying and extensive accreditations without protest). As seen in Figure 1, the mean of the sampled NGOs’ collaboration scores more than tripled, rising steadily after the protest-heavy years of 1999-2001.

FIGURE 1 HERE

More disaggregated trends in accreditation and lobbying also indicate increasing collaboration. The percentage of NGOs accredited to at least one international organization fell between 1998 and 2001, but rebounded thereafter. The average number of NGO accreditations shows a similar trajectory: the mean dropped from 3.4 in 1998 to 3.0 in 2001, and rose thereafter to 4.5 by 2011. (See Figure 2 below.) Meanwhile, although fewer than half the sampled NGOs reported lobbying activities, utilization of this strategy increased from 33 to 44 percent between 1997 and 2000, and remained essentially steady thereafter (at 43 percent in 2011). In other words, even as the AGM was establishing a reputation for confronting IOs in the late 1990s, many constituent groups were quietly working a more collaborative angle.

FIGURE 2 HERE

7 The collaboration index score combines individual scores on four measures: protest (0/1), lobbying (0/1), neither lobby nor accreditation (0/1), and number of accreditations (scored on a 0 to 0.5 ordinal scale, in which 0 accreditations = 0, 1-2 accreditations = 0.1, 3-4 accreditations = 0.2, 5-6 accreditations = 0.3, 7-8 accreditations = 0.5, and more than 8 accreditations = 0.5). The formula for computing the collaboration index: CI = -0.5(protest) + -0.5(neither lobby nor accreditation) + 0.5(lobby) + 0.5(accreditation range). Factor analysis confirmed a close relationship among the individual components of the index: the correlation between accreditation and protest was .792; between accreditation and protest was .716; and between protest and lobbying was .824.

8 Formal accreditation is not strictly necessary for NGOs to lobby international institutions, and thus their reported lobbying can be viewed as a form of engagement distinct from accreditation.
Yet the sample data also show differences emerging within the movement as a whole regarding collaboration with IOs. The key year for growing variability appeared to be 1999: the standard deviation of scores on the collaboration index jumped 16 percent from the period 1996-1998 to that of 1999-2011. Yet these strategic differences must be understood not simply as growing variability but rather a divergence. In 1996, over 60 percent of NGOs that reported either lobbying or protest engaged in both—i.e., they pursued a diversified, insider-outsider approach to IOs. Within a couple of years that number had fallen to barely 40 percent. The proportion of NGOs engaging in either protest or lobbying, but not both, showed a mirrored increase to nearly 60 percent. (See Figure 3.) This shift did not come as a result of NGOs suddenly switching from an insider to outsider approach (or vice versa): none of the sampled NGOs reported a change in strategy in 1998-99. As noted below, this strategic split manifested itself within emerging global civil society forums such as the World Social Forum, with outsiders seeking to shame and even shun insiders.

There are thus two puzzles to unravel. First, why did AGM groups, which so energetically protested multilateral institutions in the late 1990s, increase their collaboration thereafter? Second, how do we explain the strategic divergence among NGOs vis-à-vis relations with IOs?

**FIGURE 3 HERE**

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Operationalization of variables

Four dependent variables were used to capture IO-NGO relations. The general measure was the collaboration index, specified earlier, which ranges from -1 (pure contestation) to 1 (pure

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9 The standard deviation of collaboration index scores was 0.438 in 1996-1998; it was 0.496 in 1999-2011.
10 Thirteen of the sampled NGOs did not report either lobbying or protest activities during 1996-2011.
collaboration). The other three were binary variables for each of the index’s component parts, allowing both a robustness check on the results regarding the index and specific insights into patterns of NGO accreditation, lobbying, and protest vis-à-vis international organizations.

Data were collected on a variety of independent variables, all scaled 0 to 1. Among the structural hypotheses, the first was NGO budget, associated with the liberal claim that IOs are more likely to embrace NGOs with greater resources. While budget may not perfectly capture the concept of NGO capacity, it is reasonable to assume greater resources indicate greater capabilities—and thus utility for IOs—overall.\(^\text{11}\) Two variables associated with political opportunity structure are IO openness and post-9/11. Drawing on data from Sommerer and Tallberg (2011), IO openness depicts the range of access offered to NGOs in a given year by a representative sample of 50 IOs, to test the hypothesis that greater IO openness overall should have a positive effect on levels of IO-NGO collaboration. The latter is a binary variable indicating whether the observation year is after 2001, allowing evaluation of whether a less protest-tolerant post-9/11 political environment induced more NGO collaboration with IOs. The final structural variable is economic environment, testing whether increased inter-NGO competition in times of diminished resource availability induces greater collaboration. This variable was measured as a function of annual GDP growth in four countries—Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States—in which, as home countries of many of the sampled NGOs as well as important foundations, expansion should be associated with greater resource availability. Their contribution to the economic environment variable was weighted by the relative size of their economies and lagged by one year.

\(^\text{11}\) The somewhat reduced number of cases reported in the regression results reflects the fact that some NGO budgets in some years could not be obtained from the Yearbook, online, or in annual reports, nor via repeated email requests. The missing data were distributed randomly across NGOs and years, and thus there is little reason to believe that the exclusion of these cases biased the regression results.
To evaluate whether less radical groups are more collaborative with IOs, I generated a radicalism variable through a content analysis of NGOs’ aims as reported in two sources, the *Yearbook* and mission statements on their websites. The analysis counted words identifying the nature of challenges to address (reformist: problem, concern, difficulty, etc.; radical: exploitation, domination, oppression, etc.); the nature of desired change (reformist: improve, help, aid, etc.; radical: reject, resist, overturn, etc.); and the disposition toward capitalism (negative attributions of neoliberal globalization, transnational corporations, etc.). An NGO’s radicalism score was the mean of the *Yearbook* and website codings, weighted by the relative length of each in terms of word count.\(^\text{12}\)

To test the formalization hypothesis, I used two measures of NGO formalization: an executive index and a rule index. The executive index comprised the presence/absence of an international headquarters or secretariat, and the strength of the chief executive.\(^\text{13}\) It captured the relative centralization of authority within an NGO’s international umbrella organization, and thus the presence of officers authorized to articulate and represent the views of its affiliates. The rule index comprised the presence/absence of a board of directors, an executive committee, and a periodic congress or assembly among affiliates. It captured the existence of rules distributing authority among these groups (and the executive) and potentially institutionalizing relationships of internal accountability.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{12}\) The contribution of the website mission statement, observed in January 2010 and affirmed a year later, was reduced by 10% each year to reflect the relative distance from 2011. Thus the website mission statement played a far smaller role in NGOs’ ideology scores for 1996 than for 2011, reflecting an expectation that we can be less confident, as we move farther away from 2011, that website mission statements offered a valid measure of ideology.

\(^{13}\) A strong chief executive was one whose title suggested a high level of executive authority, such as an executive director, secretary-general, or president. A weak chief executive suggested only minimal executive authority, such as a coordinator. They were coded: 0=no chief executive; 1=weak chief executive; and 2=strong chief executive.

\(^{14}\) Factor analysis demonstrated that the individual components of the executive and rule indexes were highly correlated, though reliability analysis showed somewhat lower alphas—.57 for the executive index, and .39 for the rule index. Meanwhile, there was only a weak correlation between the two indexes (.049), reaffirming that they measure distinct aspects of formalization.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively show over-time change in the independent variables. Among the macro level variables, we see a notable contrast in trends between economic environment and NGO budgets: the former varied widely but with an overall downward trend, while the latter remained relatively steady—suggesting that funds available to NGOs may not be as sensitive to the economic cycle as the resource mobilization hypothesis implies. IO openness, for its part, increased slowly and steadily throughout the period, suggesting greater opportunities for NGO access, should they choose to embrace it. Figure 5 depicts the sample means of NGO attributes in each year, demonstrating that slow but steady change also characterized NGO ideologies and formalization. The sampled NGOs became more radical on average between 1996 and 2005, as new SMOs joined the AGM. The two measures of formalization, for their part, moved in contrasting directions: sampled NGOs became somewhat less centralized (executive index) but slightly more institutionalized (rule index), with much of the change occurring in the late 1990s.

FIGURE 4 HERE

FIGURE 5 HERE

Model specification and results

I estimated four models to assess the impact of these determinants of IO-NGO collaboration. Model 1 used standard OLS regression to estimate their effect on overall IO-NGO relations as measured by the collaboration index. The other three used binary logistic regression to estimate their effect on NGOs’ accreditation at (Model 2), lobbying of (Model 3), and protest against (Model 4) international organizations. Because the data were pooled, regression analysis yielded only general insights regarding IO-NGO relations rather than explanations of over-time change.
(Time series analysis was not possible due to the limited number of observations per year.) Each model includes binary year variables to control for autocorrelation.15

**TABLE 2 HERE**

The results shown in Table 2 above indicate NGO budgets, radicalism, and formalization had the strongest relationship to overall IO-NGO collaboration as well as more specific accreditation, lobbying, and protest choices. Each of these independent variables was statistically significant across the four models—with the exception of the lobbying model, whose results were affected by the relative infrequency of lobbying—and, with some qualification, indicating the expected positive or negative relationship with collaboration. The political opportunity structure and resource mobilization hypotheses found less support.

The most reliable predictor of IO-NGO collaboration was NGO budgets. The strong, positive effect of this variable across each of the models indicates a robust relationship between the levels of NGO budgets and IO-NGO collaboration, and thus supports the liberal claim that collaboration is most likely when NGOs are able to supplement IOs’ resource base. NGO budgets were clearly the best predictor of lobbying, suggesting if not a “pay to play” system then at least a greater inclination of wealthier NGOs to behave like traditional interest groups. The statistical relationship is weakest vis-à-vis accreditation, which is somewhat contrary to expectations given that accreditation could “lock in” useful NGO collaboration for IOs. A more substantial caveat is that the direction of the causal arrow is unclear: it may be just as likely that collaboration with IOs opens up new wells of resources for NGOs as is the reverse—a two-way relationship qualitative evidence tends to confirm.

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15 I also estimated models using a lagged dependent variable as a substitute for year controls. The results were substantively similar, though the fit (r²) of the model using the lagged dependent variable was higher because an NGO’s relationship to IOs in t_i is highly predictable based on the relationship at t_{i-1}—i.e., a given NGO’s relations with IOs do not change much from year to year.
The results also support the ideology hypothesis. More radical NGOs were less likely to have a generally collaborative relationship with and accreditations at IOs, and far more likely to protest them, than their less radical counterparts. The relationship between radical aims and protest was particularly strong, tending to confirm that even if more radical groups do occasionally collaborate with IOs it is part of strategy that prominently features participation in mass demonstrations against them. The positive relationship between radicalism and lobbying is more surprising, though not entirely unexpected (see della Porta 2009). Thus we must be careful not to call more radical groups “outsiders” by definition: even NGOs at the extremes of the ideological distribution—which high or low levels of radicalness—may be pragmatic in how they engage IOs to promote their goals.

The regression analysis also affirms a positive relationship between NGO formalization and collaboration with IOs, though variably so. The substantive and statistical significance of the executive index supports the claim that more centralized NGOs are more likely to pursue IO collaboration, while a strong negative relationship with protest is consistent with the claim that many NGO activists are suspicious of the principle of centralization, whether among themselves or their interlocutors. By contrast, the results regarding the rule index are, except with respect to accreditation, contrary to expectations: more internally rule-bound NGOs were less likely to collaborate with international organizations, and more likely to protest. This finding calls into question the expectation that collaboration increases because IOs select for more formalized NGOs. Why were more rule-oriented NGOs engaged in protest? As suggested below, they may place a higher value on their own internal transparency and accountability and thus be unwilling to tolerate perceived nontransparency and unaccountability among IOs.
The results offered less support to the POS and resource mobilization hypotheses. Neither IO openness nor post-9/11 showed a consistently positive relationship with IO-NGO collaboration. The seemingly paradoxical results regarding IO openness—a negative relationship with accreditation and lobbying, but positive with overall collaboration—likely reflects not only the strong negative relationship with protest but also the collaboration index’s sensitivity to the number of NGO accreditations. Meanwhile, the expected positive relationship between post-9/11 and collaboration was borne out, but it appears 9/11 was not a hard inflection point for IO-NGO relations—especially vis-à-vis protest. Economic environment, for its part, had its strongest effect on accreditation, yet NGOs were less likely to pursue accreditation during hard times—despite the fact that it was “cheap” compared to lobbying, which the results suggest is the activity of choice for wealthy NGOs. This result is consistent with the aforementioned lack of a clear correlation between the economic environment and NGOs’ reported budgets.

We must be cautious in drawing conclusions from the regression analysis. The results are based on a comparatively modest number (404) of observations. The data in the Yearbook and NGO websites are self-reported by NGOs, and must be treated with a degree of caution. However, there is no reason to believe the nature of these data sources would introduce systematic bias—i.e., that certain NGOs to over- or underestimate their budgets, misrepresent their ideological goals, and the like in systematic ways. Perhaps of greater concern is that reliance on the Yearbook biases the sample toward more formal organizations. Data requirements make such a bias difficult to avoid. As such, the subsequent qualitative analysis considers the

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16 A potential concern with each of the structural variables is that, because they are constant across NGO observations in any given year, year dummy variables might undercut their significance as a result of multicollinearity. As such, I estimated models for each dependent variable that excluded the year dummies to test for this problem. In each, neither economic environment nor post-9/11 approached statistical significance; IO openness demonstrated a positive relationship approaching statistical significance with the collaboration index (p=.092) and accreditation (p=.139) and a statistically significant negative relationship with protest (p=.031).

17 Because I did not use my data on NGO accreditations as a measure of IO openness but rather used data from Sommerer and Tallberg 2011, there is no inherent endogeneity problem (at least statistically).
activities of highly informal groups such as ATTAC, which promotes a tax on international financial transactions, and People’s Global Action (PGA), which contests all forms of centralized corporate power. This qualitative analysis affirms and to some extent qualifies the quantitative findings, and offers insight into the AGM’s evolution and strategic fracture.

The AGM and multilateral economic institutions: qualitative analysis

As Carpenter (2007, 2011) has shown, dynamics of NGO advocacy involve not only interactions with authorities but also with one another as they seek to influence the international agenda. Such triangular relations were particularly important for the AGM, whose internal cohesion was sensitive to the question of collaboration with IOs. This section examines evolving relations both within the AGM and between the AGM and the international financial institutions (IFIs), the IMF and World Bank. It aims to add depth and dimension to the findings of the regression analysis, focusing on a subset of IOs and a small number of NGOs. It draws on ten author interviews with staff members of four US and European-based NGOs (WWF, Public Citizen-Global Trade Watch (PC-GTW), Jubilee USA, and the Women in Development Network (WIDE)) as well as officials from the IMF and World Bank. These interview data are supplemented by references to relevant reports and the secondary literature.18

The four NGOs were selected to represent different substantive focuses (environment, debt, development, and general skepticism of free trade) and varying strategic inclinations. Given the IFIs’ role in promoting neoliberalism, these and other AGM groups’ interaction with the IMF and World Bank proved particularly contentious within the movement. Thus the polarizing question of engaging the IFIs offers particular insight into the strategic divergence

18 The number of NGO interviews was limited by resource and logistical constraints, and thus is focused primarily on US and European groups.
within the AGM in the late 1990s, but requires caution in generalizing these findings to NGO-NGO relations more broadly.

A specific combination of micro- and macro-level factors appears to have shaped both IFI-AGM and intra-AGM relations since the late 1990s. More radical and decentralized networks took on increasing visibility after the late 1990s just as broader economic and political pressures were making sustaining coalition unity more difficult, fostering a growing split between what Pleyers (2010) calls “the way of subjectivity” (radical, decentralized groups) and “the way of reason” (reformist, bureaucratic NGOs). This divergence appears to have developed primarily as a result of changes in the composition the AGM, with growing ideological and organizational diversity inhibiting consensus on both a coherent AGM policy platform and relations with MEIs.

*Structural factors: economic and political environment*

The economic and political environment had a modest effect on AGM-IFI relations during the late 1990s and early 2000s. AGM groups were sensitive to changes in the disbursements and priorities of funding institutions, but greater resource scarcity did not uniformly drive NGOs toward more collaborative approaches. And while AGM groups did in many cases collaborate with the IMF and World Bank in response to decreasing post-9/11 opportunities to influence the United States and G8, NGOs created their own opportunities to access IFI officials.

Despite economic fluctuations during the late 1990s and early 2000s, NGOs enjoyed relatively reliable financing from governments and private foundations, and private citizens. As expanding US and world economies gave way to greater volatility in the 2000s, funding institutions’ disbursements rose and fell but not necessarily in sync with one another. In the United States, USAID budgets rose across funding categories after 1998, though with drops
coinciding with the 2001 and 2008-9 recessions. Development agencies in Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission had relatively stable budgets over the entire period. The Ford Foundation saw its annual disbursements for programs on economic development, women’s rights, and the environment fall between 2000 and 2006, rebounding somewhat thereafter. Yet few NGOs reported significant variability or declines in their operating budgets over the period.

A couple of NGO staffers indicated a changing resource environment did affect strategy, though less as a function of the economic cycle than a post-9/11 reallocation of government and foundation resources toward security-related projects. According to the WIDE activist, “policy change in the US government meant the policy priorities of the Ford Foundation changed.”

As she and the WWF staff member affirmed, under these conditions many NGOs did collaboratively engage both governments and the IFIs—though funder-dependent groups faced greater pressures to collaborate than those whose resources come largely from membership dues (e.g., Human Rights Watch) or national affiliates (e.g., the International Trade Union Confederation, or ITUC). According to the WIDE staffer, whose organization’s comparatively small annual budget of $0.7 million came primarily from the European Commission and European governments, funding did not come with strings attached regarding “good behavior” but the need to tap official sources implied less “strategic autonomy” than when funds came from private sources. She cited Greenpeace, which draws revenues primarily from membership dues and merchandising, as having greater flexibility in its advocacy activities.

But there was little evidence of a competitive “scramble” among AGM groups. Rather, NGOs often cooperated to obtain resources, supporting Bandy and Smith’s (2005: 236) claim

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19 According to Ford Foundation’s annual reports, its allocations in the development, women’s rights, and environment categories did stagnate in the 2000s, only recapturing 2000 levels in 2008.
that, “economic crises can prompt transnational coalition building.” Groups reliant on government or foundation grants, which typically funded specific campaigns rather than general operations, tended to work together on joint funding proposals, as “the chances are when you’re in a coalition that you’ll actually more easily get money than if you’re by yourself.” Funding cooperation was particularly prevalent among smaller NGOs that lacked the autonomous capabilities of larger organizations like Oxfam or WWF (European Commission 2010). Yet even larger groups that competed directly for resources occasionally engaged in direct material cooperation: the WWF staffer noted that his organization had once helped pay Greenpeace’s legal bills. Meanwhile, for NGOs like ATTAC, umbrella organizations were minimal operations to coordinate strategies and share information among affiliates—and near-zero communication costs allowed them to keep fundraising, and related constraints on their activities, to a minimum.

Therefore, the economic environment effect appears to have been limited to funder-dependent NGOs’ relations with IOs—and to have little connection to the AGM’s strategic divergence. Volatility in AGM groups’ strategies occurred in the late 1990s while stability reigned in the 2000s (see Figure 2), which contrasts with an economic environment in which stability reigned in the late 1990s and volatility prevailed in the 2000s. This divergence also did not develop along budgetary lines. Although some wealthier groups like the International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA) and European Environmental Bureau lobbied the IFIs without protesting and some less well-funded groups like the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and ATTAC did the reverse, many wealthier NGOs (e.g., WWF, Greenpeace, ITUC) and poorer ones (e.g., WIDE, Survival International, Friends of the Earth International (FOEI)) did both. As Figure 3 indicated, NGOs pursuing mixed, insider-outsider

20 Author interview with staff member at WIDE (July 2010).
strategies declined as a percentage of the overall population, yet there is no clear relationship, cross-sectionally or over time, between an NGO’s budget and its strategic “purity.”

The political environment seems to have had a more powerful effect: NGOs increasingly cooperated with the IFIs during the late 1990s and early 2000s as these institutions became more accessible and the hegemonic state, the United States, less so. As Tallberg et al. (2013) have showed, IOs openness increased significantly in the late 1990s. The IFIs participated in this trend, inaugurating NGO symposia at their annual meetings that drew on the Bank’s large staff dedicated to coordination with NGOs. IMF and World Bank officials affirmed an increase in their institutions’ openness, particularly to groups that could marshal expertise and engage in reasoned dialogue. They emphasized a willingness to listen to NGO critiques of their lending policies, and World Bank officials in particular noted that the terms of structural adjustment programs were “debatable.” Neither institution was highly discriminating regarding which groups got invited to consultations—in part because their external relations departments did not want to have to pick and choose—though the IMF occasionally held smaller consultations with more “serious” NGOs. The Bank gave some preference to “very active” groups that “play on a global scale,” but replaced its selective World Bank–NGO Committee in 2003 with a Civil Society Policy Forum that is open to a wider range of NGOs (Willets 2011: 57). Both favored NGOs that “make analytical arguments” as opposed to “uninformed” groups that “just howl all the time.” Neither indicated any concern with the resources NGOs could bring to bear—though the well-funded IFIs may differ from more impecunious UN agencies on this front.

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21 Dalton et al. 2003 showed that wealthier NGOs engage in more of all types of activities—accreditation and lobbying as well as protest—than poorer ones.
22 Similar trends were seen in WTO-sponsored NGO forums, where nonstate actor attendance grew from 108 groups at the 1996 Singapore ministerial meeting to more than 450 at the 2009 ministerial conference in Geneva.
23 Author interviews with three World Bank and three IMF officials (May 2009).
During the late 1990s G8 countries also became more open to AGM groups. Donnelly (2002) connected national-level accessibility to partisan politics, arguing that center-left governments in most G8 countries in the late 1990s increased the access and influence of anti-debt campaigners. Center-left UK and US governments were particularly amenable: in 1998, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair praised campaigners against African debt who formed a “human chain” around at a G8 summit in Birmingham, and the following year US President Bill Clinton did the same for protesters at WTO meetings in Seattle. AGM groups associated with the left—in particular, labor and environmental activists—were not part of the Bush administration’s winning coalition in 2000, reducing access opportunities in the United States prior to 9/11. However, the PC-GTW staff member claimed his organization had limited access to the Clinton administration as well; both he and the Jubilee activist said their groups focused US-based activism more on Congress than the executive branch, regardless of which party was in power.24

These activists had to operate in a post-9/11 environment in which scholars identified not only a decline in access in the United States but a less amenable international climate for protests like those at Seattle and Genoa that had brought the AGM such visibility. Among the conditions limiting NGO avenues to the US government were the decline of policy and media attention to economic issues, the dampening effect on political dissent of the USA Patriot Act, and a public preference for patriotism and solidarity (Rauch et al. 2007; Vasi 2006; Weinberg 2003; Ayers 2005; Bandy & Smith 2005). In this environment, the PC-GTW staffer claimed, protest-oriented NGOs were most affected: it was not that they were “cowed” by the US government, but that they perceived both the executive and legislative branches to be less focused on their core issues and less amenable to confrontational approaches. The Jubilee USA activist affirmed that the

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24 Author interviews with staff members at PC-GTW (May 2009) and Jubilee USA (June 2009).
post-9/11 environment reinforced “insider work” as opposed to “outside on the streets work.” This effect was not confined to the United States; the Brussels-based WIDE staff member declared, “Internationally, something definitely changed.”

A key change was declining international advocacy opportunities in the Group of 8. G8 summits in the early 2000s were held in inaccessible locales such as Doha, Qatar and Kanakas, Canada. Whereas 2000 and 2001 G8 summits were dominated by globalization and related issues, in 2002-2004 terrorism was the central issue—despite the G8’s role as a predominantly economic forum. A simple content analysis of G8 communiqués in 2000-2004, examining the percentage of words devoted respectively to globalization and terrorism, indicates this shift. (See Table 3 below.) In 2005, international economic issues once again became the main focus.

TABLE 3 HERE

This agenda shift induced divisions in the AGM. Some simply changed their targets: three of the NGO staff members said the emerging antiwar movement “cannibalized” the AGM (see also Green & Griffith 2002). Among those remaining focused on globalization, the relative closure of the United States and G8 increased the salience of the debate over engaging the more open IMF and World Bank. This shift in the political opportunity structure thus created the conditions both for greater NGO collaboration with the IFIs and for greater tension within the AGM regarding whether such collaboration was the best option to promote their agenda.

Yet despite growing access to the IFIs, AGM NGOs did not perceive cooperation with the IFIs as a panacea; an internal audit showed many were skeptical (Weinberg 2003). The WWF staff member said consultations with the IFIs had borne little fruit, while the WIDE staffer worried of being “used for having a dialogue with civil society that is not really a dialogue.” The

25 Author interviews with staff members at PC–GTW (May 2009), WIDE (July 2010), and Jubilee USA (June 2009).
26 G7/8 communiqués are available at g7.utoronto.ca/summit/index.htm.
PC-GTW representative claimed his organization’s outsider approach remained more effective, stating, “With substantially less resources than a lot of the large environmental groups that have an exclusively insider strategy, we shape public debate to a much higher degree than they do.”

The POS hypothesis assumes NGOs engage more accessible institutions because doing so is an effective means of promoting their agenda, but these groups’ skepticism of the efficacy of engaging the comparatively accessible IFIs calls this assumption into question.

More generally, the IFIs’ increased openness did not occur independently of NGO activism. As one NGO staff member claimed, “the pressure you put from the outside [you] need sometimes to open spaces on the inside.” IMF and World Bank officials confirmed that their organizations increased access in the late 1990s specifically in response to NGO campaigns, particularly for more “reasonable” and “informed” NGOs (see also O’Brien et al. 2000). This interrelationship suggests that, although political opportunities may shift independently of NGO activities, they remain difficult to separate both analytically and empirically. It also begs a question for all structural approaches to IO-NGO relations: which NGOs took advantage of expanding opportunities, and why?

**NGO attributes: ideology and organizational formalization**

The growing international NGO population—from roughly 5000 in the early 1970s to nearly 30,000 by 2011—saw particularly rapid growth of new social movement organizations that are more radical and decentralized than established groups (Yearbook of International Organizations 2011; Kriesi 1996). New SMOs took on prominent roles starting in the late 1990s and, consistent with the ideology and formalization hypotheses, differentiated strategies emerged within the

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27 Author interviews with staff members of WWF-US (May 2009), WIDE (July 2010), and PC–GTW (May 2009).
28 Author interview with WIDE staff member (July 2010).
AGM (see Table 4). More reformist, formalized NGOs engaged in greater collaboration with IFIs; more radical, informal NGOs avoided such collaboration; and NGOs with mixed ideological and structural attributes—a population that has declined in relative terms since the late 1990s—engaged in occasional collaboration.

TABLE 4 HERE

The rise of new social movements appears to have driven the strategic divergence. Even as the AGM coalesced around a shared critique of neoliberal globalization, divisions regarding relations with the IFIs were already emerging. As the 1998-2001 protests brought new SMOs into the AGM, its ideological and organizational diversity grew: among the sampled NGOs the standard deviation of the organizational and ideological variables grew 23 and 44 percent respectively during 1996-2002. This growing diversity might have produced a division of labor wherein the protest activities of some reinforced the insider approach of others—in essence, a good-cop, bad-cop strategy. Instead, it fostered a fracturing into factions with distinct and not necessarily complementary strategies vis-à-vis the IFIs.

Growing ideological diversity appears to have intensified differences regarding the possibility of reforming the IFIs, which in turn induced strategic conflict. Ayers (2005) depicts this divide as a frame conflict: while groups could agree on a diagnostic frame of anti-neoliberalism, they could not agree on a prognostic frame of neoliberalism’s alternative. Frame alignment within the coalition would have been the mechanism through which diverse groups could attain a coherent alternative vision of globalization and the role of the IFIs therein, but ideological divisions had the opposite effect of inducing frame, and thus strategic, conflict.

Less radical groups sought incremental change by emphasizing research and working through available access points to advocate for policy change. WWF sustained its ongoing
relationship with the World Bank to limit the environmental impact of its projects, following its guiding principles to “seek dialogue and avoid unnecessary confrontation” and “strive to build partnerships with other organizations, governments, businesses, and local communities.”

Eurodad focused on “lobbying for a rethinking of the dominant structural adjustment regime imposed by the IMF and the World Bank,” and played a key role in the campaign to write off African countries’ sovereign debts. Mainstream groups such as ActionAid, CIVICUS, and Transparency International played prominent roles in the Civil Society Policy Forums alongside IMF-World Bank annual meetings.

More radical groups tended to see collaborative engagement of the IFIs as akin to co-option and surrender (see Pleyers 2010; Fogarty 2011). People’s Global Action is the exemplar of this stance: its shun-and-protest posture to the IFIs followed its mission statement, which declares “a very clear rejection of capitalism” and “a confrontational attitude, since we do not think that lobbying can have a major impact in such biased and undemocratic organizations, in which transnational capital is the only real policymaker.” Somewhat less radical groups also avoided collaboration with IFIs; the PC-GTW staff member asked, “Why would we spend time lobbying a bureaucrat three steps removed from any democratic legitimacy? We wouldn’t.”

Attempts were made to bridge ideological and strategic divides. Most shunned radical fringe groups like the Black Bloc—whose protest activities included destroying property of McDonalds and Starbucks—because such tactics undercut more mainstream NGOs’ peaceful methods and message (O’Neill 2004). Meanwhile, groups like Greenpeace with a foot in both the reformist and radical camps attempted to mediate between the two, while more research-oriented organizations such as the International Forum on Globalization sought common ground by

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31 See the PGA’s “hallmarks” at peoplesglobalaction.org.
articulating shared principles of grass-roots democracy and toleration of diversity—both for
global governance and the movement itself (Cavanaugh & Mander 2004). However, the gap
between reformist and radical goals made it difficult to build a prognostic frame of
*alterglobalization*—an acceptable pro-global alternative to neoliberalism—and IFIs’ role therein.

This divide manifested itself in the World Social Forum (WSF), created in January 2001
to counter the World Economic Forum in Davos. The WSF aimed to be “an open meeting place
for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of
experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that
are opposed to neoliberalism.” Participants made a conscious decision to avoid a single
manifesto of what alterglobalization was *for*, other than democracy and justice, ostensibly to
avoid imposing a single vision on groups with a variety of goals (Grzybowski 2006). Yet in
practice the WSF adopted the premises of the more radical groups: collaboration with the IFIs
constituted co-option, and the WSF must “stand in opposition to a process of globalization
commanded by the large multinational corporations and by the governments and international
institutions at the service of those corporate interests.” This declaration proved divisive: the
WSF’s first meeting in Porto Allegre in 2001 was riven by disagreements over whether insider
tactics were permissible or whether they undermined the very purpose of the WSF. The WWF
staff member said his organization and CARE (an antipoverty NGO) were excoriated by radical
groups for “selling out” by collaborating with the IFIs, and as a result stopped attending the
WSF. In their absence, the WSF solidified a common position against the IFIs as tools of a
capitalist system they sought to shatter.  

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33 See the 2011 declaration of the WSF’s Social Movements Assembly at
Growing organizational diversity also fed strategic conflict in the AGM. The general trend in the international NGO population by the early 2000s was toward greater informality and decentralization (Smith 2005), a trend mirrored within the AGM. Its growth in the late 1990s brought more informal, decentralized NGOs like ATTAC and PGA into coalition with more traditionally bureaucratic labor and environmental organizations like ITUC and Greenpeace. The former rejected the organizing principle of hierarchy and thus any notion of legitimate IFI authority; the latter acknowledged the IFIs’ authority and sought to influence them either via lobbying only (including ActionAid, Amnesty International, and ISCA) or a mixture of lobbying and protest (e.g., Greenpeace, ITUC, Oxfam).

The birth in the late 1990s of networks such as ATTAC and PGA introduced into the AGM groups that self-identified as social movement organizations whose decentralization and informality were essential elements of their raison d’être. PGA declared its organizational philosophy to be “based on decentralization and autonomy” in defiant contrast to the hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational structure of the IMF, WTO, and multinational corporations. For such networks, the collaboration of, say, WWF with the World Bank provided a veneer of legitimacy to the latter’s unaccountable bureaucracy while destroying the former’s grass-roots legitimacy. ATTAC, for its part, adopted a less contentious position: although committed to its network organization and critical of the IFIs’ role in sustaining neoliberalism, ATTAC remained open to a UN role in constraining global capital mobility and financial speculation.

Even as PGA and ATTAC rejected formalization and collaboration with IFIs, others were formalizing in the context of external pressures (Price 2003). Critics of NGOs had pointed out that they often lacked transparency in policy decisions and allocation of resources—two critiques

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34 On NGO-World Bank relations and NGO accountability to supporters, see Fox & Brown 1998. O’Neill 2004 suggests mainstream NGOs like WWF participate in protests to sustain their grass-roots legitimacy.
NGOs aimed at the IMF and World Bank (Bhagwati 2004). In response, established NGOs such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and Transparency International created and circulated in June 2006 an Accountability Charter. Key provisions of the charter included proper financial accounting, clarification of internal governance structures and processes, and professional management—essentially associating accountability with professional, bureaucratic organizations. Groups promoting the charter saw it as an important signal to retain the confidence of foundations, the media, and the general public, and urged all international NGO networks to sign and adhere to its principles. Few informal networks have done so, highlighting persistent differences in organizational principles within the movement.35

These organizational differences were magnified somewhat by the IFIs’ inclination to offer greater accreditation and lobbying access to more formalized NGOs. The IFIs followed the lead of ECOSOC in establishing guidelines that encourage formalization as a precondition for accreditation, requiring that an NGO exist for more than two years, “have a democratic decision making mechanism,” and receive funding primarily from affiliates and members rather than governments.36 Yet, as noted, the IMF and World Bank did not strictly apply such guidelines when inviting NGOs to symposia and other consultations, and the WIDE staff member asserted that since the late 1990s NGOs have had success in ensuring IMF-World Bank civil society consultations are open and inclusive of NGOs with varying levels of formalization.37 These examples are consistent with the reported statistical insignificance of the rule index—which measured the presence of internal NGO structures similar to those listed in ECOSOC

35 Among the sampled NGOs, there was no appreciable change in levels of NGO formalization following the promulgation of the charter. For the provisions of the charter, see http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/.  
36 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Nongovernmental Organizations Section, <<http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo>> (accessed April 9, 2009). ECOSOC’s traditional guidelines—developed primarily for labor groups, the main civil society “partners” until the proliferation of environmental, human rights, and other NGOs after the 1970s—included an established headquarters, an administration, authorized representatives, a policymaking body, and a presence in at least two countries (Willets 1982, 2011).  
37 Author interview with WIDE staff member (July 2010).
guidelines—vis-à-vis accreditation. Formalization is not a strict precondition for NGO collaboration with IOs; some informal networks have chosen not to collaborate.

In the burgeoning AGM, diversity begat divergence. The ideological split made it difficult to build a coherent prognostic frame for alterglobalization and the acceptability of collaboration with the MEIs to advance its cause. Meanwhile, the emergence of more informal SMOs in the late 1990s and subsequent increase in formalization of some more longstanding NGOs widened gaps in basic organizational principles, exacerbating differences between formalized NGOs whose organizational structures would be unaffected by cooperation with IOs and informal networks whose members feared their democratic decentralization would be lost through such collaboration. While a less amenable economic and political environment put pressure on the AGM’s cohesion, these ideological and organizational differences played a bigger role in the coalition’s strategic fracturing regarding relations with the MEIs.

Conclusion

The future shape of global governance rests in part on the nature and extent of collaboration among IOs and NGOs. This article has identified an overall increase in IO-NGO collaboration since the contention of the late 1990s, and a growing divide within global civil society over working with multilateral economic institutions in particular to improve global economic governance. As such, it has addressed two central questions: why has IO-NGO collaboration increased, and why did the AGM experience an internal strategic divergence? Quantitative and qualitative evidence indicate that, although political and economic conditions brought both opportunities and pressures for NGOs to work with IOs and created stresses within the AGM itself, changes in the composition of the movement were the primary drivers of the overall
increase in collaboration and especially the strategic divergence. Wealthier, reformist, and bureaucratic NGOs led the move toward greater collaboration with both the MEIs and UN agencies, even as the emergence of more radical and decentralized SMOs increased fractures within the overall AGM. The movement did not die—it was resuscitated in the 2011 Occupy protests around the world—but after the halcyon days of the late 1990s it essentially splintered into groups independently pursuing their preferred insider or outsider strategies.

These findings reinforce a move in the IR literature toward a more micro-level focus on the attributes of international NGO networks as they engage global governance. Carpenter (2007, 2011), following the earlier work of Keck and Sikkink (1998), has demonstrated how network centrality shapes which groups get their preferred issues on the international agenda, and Avant et al. (2010, *passim*) have shown how NGOs wielding various forms of authority contribute to global governance. The evidence presented here suggests IO-NGO relations as well as NGO-NGO relations are less sensitive to structural conditions than to NGOs’ internal characteristics. The large-N empirical analysis makes these conclusions comparatively robust, and should be seen as a first step toward better understanding the balance between macro and micro-level factors driving IO-NGO relations.

Future research on IO-NGO relations should further explore the consequences for NGOs’ role in global governance of the growing diversity of global civil society. While some have lauded the diversity of the AGM (Grzybowski 2006), diversity complicates prognostic framing. Labor and environmental groups may agree on the danger of a “race to the bottom” in standards, but have different perspectives on World Bank programs supporting industrial expansion in developing countries. Religious and Marxist groups may agree on the unacceptability of income inequality and mass poverty, but disagree on the efficacy of charity and other meliorative
measures in the pursuit of economic justice. NGOs based in the North may want to use the WTO to enforce higher global labor, environmental, or human rights standards, while South-based NGOs may view this as unwelcome imposition of alien policies on their societies. Shared critique enables movement cohesion, but pressures to articulate a positive alternative and to engage institutional authorities constructively bring intra-coalitional conflicts into the open.

Structural conditions nevertheless remain important, especially as Western countries’ predominance in global governance wanes. The accessibility of IOs is not simply a function of their own choices or NGO pressures, but also of the preferences of great powers (Krasner 1995; Drezner 2007). A power shift toward large developing countries—particularly but not exclusively to China and India—will, in theory, bring them more influence over all aspects of these institutions’ business, including civil society relations. Whether they will be less supportive of maintaining or extending NGO access is unclear. But as the clout of highly accessible governments like that of the United States and United Kingdom diminishes, so does the international impact of NGO lobbying in these countries. Fifteen years ago NGOs’ successful lobbying of the Clinton administration was a sufficient condition to get core labor and environmental standards on the WTO agenda; this is surely no longer true. Moreover, authoritarian countries like China and Russia place tight controls on civil society organizations at home, and may be wary of arrangements such as those used by the World Bank to empower civil society within client countries. Amenable political conditions remain necessary, if not sufficient, for the overall trend toward greater IO-NGO collaboration to continue.

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<td>Rainforest Action Network</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Club</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>1972 (1892)</td>
<td>Washington DC</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidar</td>
<td>Labor rights</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survival Int’l</td>
<td>Human rights, indigenous peoples</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third World Network</td>
<td>Social justice, South issues</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Penang, Malaysia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transnational Institute</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparency Int’l</td>
<td>Democracy, anti-corruption</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Via Campesina</td>
<td>Farmer’s rights</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Int’l League of Peace and Freedom</td>
<td>Human rights (women), social justice</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<td>WorldYWCA</td>
<td>Human rights (women), religious</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>WorldWatch Institute</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Wildlife Fund Int’l</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Gland, Switzerland</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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</table>

**Note:** Figures on collaboration index are scaled -1 (least collaborative with IOs) to 1 (most collaborative); figures for budget, ideology, and formalization (executive index) are scaled 0 to 1 to facilitate comparison. All figures are from 2011. Year established refers to international umbrella organization; additional dates in parentheses refer to the year the initial affiliate was founded.
Table 2. Explaining overall IO-NGO collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Accreditation</th>
<th>Lobbying</th>
<th>Protest</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>index</td>
<td>index</td>
<td>index</td>
<td>index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO budget</td>
<td>.365*** (.059)</td>
<td>3.244* (1.284)</td>
<td>2.804*** (.406)</td>
<td>1.520** (.510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO openness</td>
<td>.551 (.326)</td>
<td>-32.921 (.578)</td>
<td>-6.477 (.288)</td>
<td>-17.856 (.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-9/11</td>
<td>.036 (.069)</td>
<td>6.005 (.845)</td>
<td>.967 (.410)</td>
<td>2.456 (5.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource mobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic environment</td>
<td>.013 (.090)</td>
<td>-.105 (.350)</td>
<td>.062 (.192)</td>
<td>-.069 (2.561)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalism</td>
<td>-.661*** (.095)</td>
<td>-1.968* (1.012)</td>
<td>1.543* (.634)</td>
<td>11.017*** (.1214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive index</td>
<td>.654*** (.068)</td>
<td>2.895*** (.858)</td>
<td>.198 (.466)</td>
<td>-3.566*** (.669)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule index</td>
<td>-.435*** (.093)</td>
<td>1.772 (.312)</td>
<td>-.685 (.626)</td>
<td>5.469*** (.809)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 1996</td>
<td>-.131 (.101)</td>
<td>-1.957 (7.020)</td>
<td>-904 (3.564)</td>
<td>-925 (4.663)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 1997</td>
<td>-.148 (.101)</td>
<td>-1.674 (5.897)</td>
<td>-864 (2.973)</td>
<td>-363 (3.878)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 1998</td>
<td>-.091 (.100)</td>
<td>17.745 (8450.32)</td>
<td>-.741 (2.145)</td>
<td>-210 (2.787)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 1999</td>
<td>-.118 (.092)</td>
<td>-.995 (3.061)</td>
<td>-406 (1.598)</td>
<td>-277 (2.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000</td>
<td>-.071 (.090)</td>
<td>-.637 (1.505)</td>
<td>-.098 (.849)</td>
<td>-.310 (1.063)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-.071 (.090)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>-.028 (.089)</td>
<td>-4.138 (8.777)</td>
<td>-1.038 (4.340)</td>
<td>-2.154 (5.686)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2003</td>
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<td>-3.128 (7.056)</td>
<td>-971 (3.484)</td>
<td>-1.587 (4.560)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-3.007 (5.388)</td>
<td>-.598 (2.629)</td>
<td>-1.062 (3.440)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2005</td>
<td>.000 (.087)</td>
<td>-2.514 (3.813)</td>
<td>-.457 (1.828)</td>
<td>-.763 (2.386)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-1.596 (2.587)</td>
<td>-1.78 (1.246)</td>
<td>-.551 (1.628)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2007</td>
<td>.039 (.087)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2008</td>
<td>.045 (.088)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2009</td>
<td>.044 (.088)</td>
<td>.566 (1.107)</td>
<td>-.094 (.591)</td>
<td>.073 (.785)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2010</td>
<td>.052 (.088)</td>
<td>.552 (1.109)</td>
<td>-.115 (.592)</td>
<td>.057 (.786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2011</td>
<td>.057 (.089)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.331* (.155)</td>
<td>8.508 (22.394)</td>
<td>.718 (11.309)</td>
<td>1.537 (14.866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>404</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>404</td>
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<tr>
<td>r²</td>
<td>.512</td>
<td>.555</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.569</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>0.326</td>
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</table>

**Note:** Figures shown are unstandardized coefficients (β). Figures in parentheses are standard errors. *p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td><em>Extensive collaboration (insiders)</em></td>
<td><em>Occasional collaboration</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td><em>Occasional collaboration</em></td>
<td><em>No collaboration (outsiders)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. NGO attributes and IO collaboration**

*Formalization*
After the Halcyon Days—figure files

Figure 1: Average levels of IO-NGO collaboration

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations, various years.
Figure 2: Average number of accreditations

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations, various years.
Figure 3: Decline of mixed NGO strategies

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations, various years.
Figure 4: NGO budget, economic environment, and IO openness, 1996-2011

Sources: Yearbook of International Organizations, various years; World Bank (www.worldbank.org); Sommerer and Tallberg 2011.
Figure 5: NGO radicalism and formalization, 1996-2011

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations, various years.